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CURRENT DECISIONS
Conflicts of Law-ToRTs-PoLICY CONSIDERATIONS. In Clark v.
Clark,1 plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile which her husband was
driving, sought damages for injuries allegedly caused by her husband's
negligence. The evidence shows that both parties were domiciled in
New Hampshire, and that the trip was begun in New Hampshire with
the intention of going to another city in the same state; however, this
trip took them into Vermont where the accident occurred. The plain-
tiff, in a pre-trial order to the Superior Court, moved that the sub-
stantive law of New Hampshire should govern the rights of the parties,
thus raising the question of whether New Hampshire or Vermont law
should govern the case. This question of law was then transferred to
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire for its determination. The
conflict between the laws of the two states was unmistakable as New
Hampshire's law provides that a guest passenger may recover from the
host if only lack of ordinary care is shown;2 as distinguished from
Vermont which has a guest statute under which a host is liable only if he
was grossly or willfully negligent.'
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire ordered that the law of New
Hampshire should govern the rights of the parties and in so holding
it rejected the old mechanical rule that the "law of the place of wrong
determines whether a person has sustained a legal wrong." 4 The court
based its decision directly upon five "relevant choice-influencing con-
siderations": 5 (1) Predictability of results; (2) Maintenance of reason-
able orderliness and good relationships among the states; (3) Simplifica-
tion of the judicial task; (4) Advancement of the forum's governmental
interests; (5) The court's preference for what it regards as the better
rule of law.6 The court explained that the process of applying these
1. 22 A. 2d 205 (N.H. 1966).
2. Morin v. Letourneau, 102 N. H. 309, 156 A. 2d 131 (1959).
3. 23 VER oNTr STAT. ANN. § 1491 (1959). See generally, Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes
in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L. J. 595 (1960); Ford, Interspousal Liability for
Automobile Accidents in Conflict of Laws, 15 Prrr. L. REv. 397 (1954).
4. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 378 (1934). See also, Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des
Moines Nat. Bank, 127 Iowa 153, 98 N.W. 918 (1904); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Barney,
262 Ky. 228, 90 S.W. 2d 14 (1936); Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 A. 508 (1934).
5. See, Leflar, Cboice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y. U.L.
Rev. 267, and especially pp. 282-304 (1966) for excellent explanation and discussion of
the contents of each consideration.
6. Clark v. Clark, 222 A. 2d 205, 208, 209 (N.H. 1966). The substance of each con-
sideration as explained by the court is as follows:
(1) Predictability of results-The court emphasized the importance that parties
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considerations in each case should be an objective one and further
expressed the hope that "in course of time perhaps we will develop
'principles of preference' based upon the relevant considerations to
guide us more exactly." 7 Thus the court, after analyzing the various
considerations in relation to the facts of the case, determined that the
law of New Hampshire was clearly applicable even though the acci-
dent had occurred in Vermont and under previous New Hampshire
precedents the law of Vermont would have been controlling.
The traditional choice of law rule-that the law of the place of wrong
will govern-has been subject to a great deal of criticism in recent years.8
Several authorities, recognizing the inadequacy of the old rule in certain
situations, have adopted new theories to determine choice of law prob-
lems.9 The American Law Institute's Restatement (Second), has adopted
the rule that torts are to be governed by the local law of the state which
has the "most significant relationship" with the occurrence and with the
know in advance what law will govern a transaction so that they should be
able to plan their transaction as one with predictable results, thus assuring
uniformity of decision regardless of the forum.
(2) Maintenance of reasonable orderliness and good relationship among the
states-The court stated that this consideration required no more than that
the court should apply the law of no state which does not have a "substan-
stantial connection" with the case before it.
(3) Simplification of the judicial task-Court noted that the simplicity and ease
of application of applying its own substantive law is a significant considera-
tion but emphasized that simplification is not the only object of law and
that opposing considerations may outweigh this one.
(4) Advancement of the forum's governmental interests-Court observed that every
court must be concerned with policy interests behind the laws of its own
state, but that very often a state has no strong policy interest. The court
stressed that in most private litigation, the only real governmental interest is
in "the fair and efficient administration of justice."
(5) Court's preference for 'what it regards as the better rule of law-Court stated
that this consideration has too often been disguised and that a court should
apply what it determines to be the better rule of law when a choice of
rules presents itself to the court.
7. Id. at 210.
8. See e.g., Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TExAs L. REV. 657 (1957);
Weintraub, A Method of Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L. Q. 215
(1963); Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L. J. 595 (1960);
J.H.C. Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARv. L. REv. 881 (1951); Childres
Toward the Proper Law of Tort, 40 TExas L. REV. 336 (1962).
9. See, e.g., Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW AND CONEMP. PROS. 754
(1963); Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 959
(1952); Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process (1965); Yntema, The Objectives of Private
Internal Law, 35 CAN. B. REv. 721 (1957); Leflar, Cboice-influencing Considerations in
Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1966).
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parties.' This "significant relationship" is to be determined by examin-
ing the important "contacts" that the forums involved in the case have
with the parties and the issues."' The famous New York decision of
Babcock v. Jackson adopted this "grouping of contacts" doctrine and
thus began the trend today towards rejecting the old rule. Following
the lead of Babcock, several other courts have explicitly accepted the
Restatement's tentative draft.13 There is, however, a difference of opin-
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLIcr OF LAWS, § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964)
provides as follows:
"§379 The General Principle
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with
the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in
tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining the state of
most significant relationship include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct occurred,
(c) the domicile, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the forum will
consider the issues, the character of the tort, and the relevant purposes of
the tort rules of the interested states.
§ 379A Personal Injuries
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury
occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless some
other state has a more significant relationship with the occurrence and the
parties as to the particular issue involved, in which event the local law of
the latter state will govern."
See generally, Note, "The Second Conflicts Restatement of Torts: A Caveat," 51
Calif. L. Rev. 762 (1963) (for critical view of Restatement (Second) view;
Reese, "Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second," 28 Law and Contemp.
Prob. 679 (1963).
11. Ibid. The Supreme Court of the United States in Richards v. United States, 369
U.S. 1 (1962) appears to hold that the Restatement view is constitutional. The court
in Richards states that "Where more than one state has sufficiently substantial contact
with the activity in question, the forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed by
the States involved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of
one or another state having such an interest in the multistate activity."
12. 12 N.Y. 2d 473, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 743, 191 N.E. 2d 279 (1963). The Court in
Babcock states that the rule to be applied is one which would give "controlling effect
to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the
occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the
litigation." 240 N.Y.S. 2d at 749 (1963). See Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig,
Leflar, Reese, Conmments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1212 (1963). But see
Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 Dura L. J. 1 (1963).
13. See, e.g., Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A. 2d 796 (1964);
Fabricus v. Horgen, 132 N.W. 2d 410 (Iowa 1965); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86,
215 A. 2d 677 (1965); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W. 2d 408 (1965);
Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co. 342 F. 2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 IMI. 2d
1967]
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ion as to what factors should be stressed and the weight to be given
to each factor or "contact." This confusion as to what standard to
apply has led several courts to retain the old rule until a satisfactory
technique for determining conflicts problems is arrived at under the new
theory."4
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in the instant case reflects
this confusion in searching for a new standard among the various
theories put forth recently. Its decision is significant in that it follows
the trend of the Restatement (Second) and the Babcock decision in
rejecting the old mechanical rule but even further since it does not
merely adopt the "contact" or "most significant relationship" theories
but sets up distinct policy considerations to determine choice of law
problems in tort cases. The process now of applying these "choice-
influencing considerations" will not be an easy one as admitted by the
court.' 5 It will depend upon the facts of the particular case and like
many other legal questions, will involve a delicate weighing process.
Nevertheless, this new emphasis on valid "choice-influencing considera-
tions," as distinguished from the traditional rule, will at least permit a
new flexibility to choice of law problems.
Robert A. Hendel
57, 213 NZE. 2d 544 (1966). For recent cases rejecting Babcock see, e.g., Friday v. Smoot,
211 A. 2d 594 (Del. 1965); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 NE. 2d 533 1965);
McDaniel v. Sim, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965); Goranson v. Capital Airlines, 345 F.
2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965).
14. See, e.g., Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E. 2d 288 (1963); Landers v. Landers,
153 Conn. 303, 216 A. 2d 183 (1966); See also Fuld's dissent in Dym v. Gordon, 16
N.Y. 2d 120, 262 N.Y. 5 2d 463, 209 N.E. 2d 792 (1965); see supra note 13 under cases
rejecting Babcock.
15. Compare Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 267 (1966) where Leflar commenting on the new standards states that "testing
of rules or decisions under 'such a set of standards will be a qualitative process of
evaluation, and there will be clear room for difference of opinion in it. That is inherent
in the nature of conflicts problems; solutions to them should usually not be me-
chanical," with Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws § 122 at 394 (1964) where Ehrenzweig
states that "these catalogues are virtually meaningless in view of their generality, com-
prehensiveness and inevitable inconsistency. In order to derive concrete solutions from
them it would be necessary to limit their scope severely and to establish standards of
relative effectiveness."
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